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Abstract—When there exists a malicious attacker in the net-
work, we need to consider the possibilities of eavesdropping and
the contamination simultaneously. Under an acyclic broadcast
network, the optimality of linear codes was shown when Eve is
allowed to attack any r edges. The optimality of linear codes is
not shown under a different assumption for Eve. As a typical
example of an acyclic unicast network, we focus on the one-hop
relay network under the single transmission scheme by assuming
that Eve attacks only one edge in each level. Surprisingly, as a
result, we find that a non-linear code significantly improves the
performance on the one-hop relay network over linear codes.
That is, a non-liner code realizes the imperfect security on this
model that cannot be realized by linear codes. This kind of
superiority of a linear code still holds even with considering the
effect of sequential error injection on information leakage.
Index Terms—secure network coding, one-hop relay network,
non-linear code, passive attack, active attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of information transmission over a network is a
crucial problem because there is a risk that a part of channels
on the network are attacked by a malicious third party. Secure
network coding enables us to guarantee the security even under
the existence of such an attacker. Cai and Yeung [1], [2],
[3] discussed the secrecy for the malicious adversary, Eve,
wiretapping a subset EE of all channels in the network. The
papers [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13] developed
several types of secure network coding. Combining the codes
in [1] and [14], the paper [15] proposed a linear code to
keep the secrecy of the message and the robustness from
the injection of error (contamination) simultaneously. Like
traditional error-correcting code and error correction network
code (i.e. against Byzantine attack) in [16], [14], the paper [15]
considered the robustness in the worst case, or equivalently
it evaluated the error probability when the adversary to inject
error knows the message to be sent. The papers [17], [18], [19]
also made similar studies. Also, the papers [18], [19], [20],
[21] showed the existence of a secrecy code that universally
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works for any type of eavesdroppers under the size constraint
of EE .
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Fig. 1. one-hop relay network.
However, two issues were not sufficiently studied in existing
papers. The first issue is the optimality of linear code. Wile
this optimality was shown in the papers [24], [2], [14] under
a general acyclic network with a single source and multiple
receivers (acyclic broadcast network), they allowed Eve to
attack any r edges in the network (See Table I). But in many
cases, linear codes are not optimal, or in other words, non-
linear code has better performance, for example, in coding for
multiple source network and classical error-correcting code
(which can be considered as error correction network coding
for a two-node network, “point-to-point network)”. In several
known examples of multiple source network, non-linear code
can do better than linear one [25]. Only a limited number
of studies [25], [4], [26] discussed non-linear codes over
networks. Hence, it has been an open problem whether the
optimality of linear code still holds for an acyclic broadcast
network even under a different assumption for Eve. That is,
if we assume a different type of assumption is imposed for
Eve, there is a possibility that a non-linear code overcomes
linear codes. To resolve this problem, in this paper, as a
typical example for unicast networks, we focus on the one-
hop relay network (Fig. 1) when the sender sends a single
element of a prime field Fp (the single transmission scheme).
In this network, it is natural to assume that Eve can attack
only one edge in each level because any code is insecure for
attacking both edges in one level. Hence, assuming that Eve
attacks one edge before and after the intermediate node, we
study whether a non-linear code overcomes linear code in this
model by adapting the imperfect secure criterion.
In fact, the perfect security is too restrictive for the single
transmission scheme. It is known that there exists an imper-
fectly secure linear code over a finite field Fq of sufficiently
large prime power q when Eve may access a subset of channels
that does not contain a cut between Alice and Bob even
when the linear code does not employ private randomness in
the intermediate nodes [34]. Hence, we adopt the imperfectly
secure criterion.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF COMPARISON WITH EXISTING RESULTS FOR SINGLE TRANSMISSION SCHEME OF A FINITE FIELD
type of type of Field optimality ofnetwork attack linear code
Paper [24] acyclic broadcast no attack sufficiently Yesnetwork large
Paper [2] acyclic broadcast any r edges sufficiently Yesnetwork are eavesdropped large
Paper [14] acyclic broadcast any r edges sufficiently Yesnetwork are injected errors large
Examples in [25] acyclic multicast no attack sufficiently Nonetwork large
passive attack one-hop 1 edge in each level any finite field Norelay network is eavesdropped
active attack one-hop 1 edge in each level prime field no secure
with F2 relay network is injected errors F2 code
active attack one-hop 1 edge in each level finite field Fq No
(Characteristic is not 2) relay network is injected errors (q 6= 2l)
Since this table addresses the single transmission scheme on a finite field, the linearity means the scalar linearity. The case with the vector linearity was
discussed in another recent paper [23], which discussed multilayer networks including one-hop relay network.
The second issue is the effect of Eve’s contamination to
help to have more information about the message. Indeed the
existing studies [15], [17], [18], [19] evaluated errors only
when the information on a part of the network is changed,
but they evaluated the secrecy only when the information
on the network is not changed1 or Eve did not know the
replaced information. On the other hand, as another model,
we assume that the goal of Eve to inject error is to help
to have more information about the message. In this case,
she may inject error according to the knowledge which she
obtained from her previous action but not the message. This
improvement for her ability of eavesdropping is essential,
and this type of attack is called an active attack while the
attack without this improvement is called a passive attack.
The recent paper [22] discussed this model, i.e., evaluated
the secrecy as well as the error when Eve contaminates the
eavesdropped information and knows the replaced information.
Then, it showed that Eve’s noise injection cannot improve her
performance of eavesdropping for linear network codes. This
kind of discussion over linear network codes was extended to
a multilayer network [23]. The effects of Eve’s contamination
depend on the type of network code. This kind of reduction
of security analysis was not shown for non-linear codes.
Therefore, we study the superiority of non-linear codes under
both settings, i.e., passive attack and active attack.
First, we show the non-existence of imperfectly secure
linear code over this network. Then, in the binary case, we
propose a non-linear code on this network, in which even if
Eve makes a passive attack, she cannot recover the original
message, i.e., the imperfect security holds. However, when she
makes an active attack before the intermediate node, she can
recover the original message. Similar unexpected properties
for a nonlinear network error-correcting code were reported
in [26]. Also, we show that the network code is limited to this
example when we impose several natural secrecy conditions on
the code over this network in the binary case. This discussion
1In other words, it seemed to be considered at that time that injecting error
might only make Eve’s wiretapping the message more difficult.
shows that no code can guarantee the security over this type of
active attack on the one-hop relay network in the binary case.
However, in the ternary case, there exists a code such that Eve
cannot completely recover the message even with this type of
active attack on the one-hop relay network. To discuss this
problem, we introduce a new concept an “anti-Latin square”,
which is an opposite concept to a Latin square. Therefore,
the goal of this paper is summarized as the derivation of
the following three facts over the one-hop relay network. (1)
No linear code is imperfectly secure. (2) In the binary case,
there exists an imperfectly secure non-linear code for passive
attacks, but no non-linear code is imperfectly secure for active
attack (3) In the ternary case, there exists an imperfectly
secure non-linear code even for active attacks. The relation
with existing studies are summarized in Table I.
Indeed, the assumption for the single transmission scheme is
crucial. The linearity of this setting is called the scalar linearity
In contrast, the linear setting is called the vector linearity
when the sender sends multiple elements of a finite field2. Our
recent paper [23] discussed multilayer networks including the
one-hop relay network. However, it addressed the case when
multiple letters are transmitted, in which, the linearity means
vector linearity. Then, the optimality of vector linearity was
shown in such a setting.
Here, we remark our setting for the intermediate node.
In our setting, only the source node is allowed to employ
scramble random numbers and the intermediate node is not
2In fact, the paper [34] discussed this kind of imperfectly secure code
under scalar linearity with a different type of network while it chooses large
q. In contrast, the paper [18] discussed a similar imperfectly secure code
construction by increasing the number of transmitted elements of the finite
field (the vector linearity) while it did not increase the size of q. The paper
[35] extended this type of vector linearity setting of imperfectly secure codes
to the case with multi-source multicast.
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allowed to use it due to the following reason3. A physical
device is required for the realization of physical random
numbers as scramble random numbers. If a high quality
physical random number is needed, the physical device is
expensive and/or consumes a non-negligible space because it
often needs high-level quantum information technologies with
advanced security analysis [27], [28]. It might be possible
to prepare such devices on the source side. However, it
increases the cost to prepare devices in the intermediate nodes
because networks with such devices require more complicated
maintenance than a conventional network. Therefore, from the
economical reason, it is natural to impose this constraint to our
network code while only a few papers [29], [30], [31], [23]
discussed this type of restriction.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives our formulation over the one-hop relay network. Next,
Section III shows the non-existence of imperfectly secure
linear code over this network. Then, Section IV discusses the
binary case. Finally, Section V studies the case when message
size is a general number d, which includes the ternary case.
II. FORMULATION
In this paper, we focus on the imperfect security, i.e., the
property that Eve cannot recover the original message with
probability one [32], [33]. To cover a large possibility, we
consider the two cases. In one case, the message X set is a
finite field Fq . In the other case, it is a quotient ring Zd. The
case of a quotient ring Zd contains the case of a prime field
Fp, which is a special case of a finite fieldFq .
Then, we consider the secure codes over the one-
hop relay network given in Fig. 1 with edges E =
{e(1), e(2), e(3), e(4)} only in the single transmission scheme,
i.e., the case when the sender sends only one element of X .
The linearity under this setting is called the scalar linearity
when X is a field Fq [25, Section I]. That is, we consider
the transmission of the message M in X by using the one-
hop relay network given in Fig. 1 when the information
at the edges is given as an element of X . Here, d is an
arbitrary natural number, and it is not necessarily a prime
number. Also, private randomness is allowed in the sender, but
no private randomness is allowed in the intermediate nodes.
Therefore, we are allowed to choose an arbitrary deterministic
function ϕ from X 2 to X 2 as our coding operation on the
intermediate node. Our encoder in the source node is given as
a stochastic map φ from X to X 2, and our decoder is given
as a deterministic function ψ from X 2 to X . Eve is allowed
to attack the subset EE of two edges of E except for the
pairs {e(1), e(2)} and {e(3), e(4)}. In this section, we call
the triplet (φ, ϕ, ψ) a code over the one-hop relay network
(Fig. 1).
We have two attack models, the passive attack and the active
attack. In the passive attack, Eve can eavesdrop two edges,
3 Since stochastic encoder is essential for secure information transmission,
we need to be careful for the availability of private randomness in each
node. However, a stochastic decoder cannot improve the performance even for
secure information transmission due to the following reason. The decoding
error probability preserves the convex combination for the decoder. Hence, the
decoding error probability of a stochastic decoder can be written as a convex
combination of the decoding error probabilities of deterministic decoders.
but cannot change the information on the attacked edge. In
the active attack, Eve can insert another information on the
attacked edge in the first group {e(1), e(2)}, and eavesdrop
one edge in the second group {e(3), e(4)}. Here, Eve cannot
change the edge to be attacked by using the information on
the attacked edge in the first group {e(1), e(2)}. When a code
satisfies the following two conditions in the respective models,
the code is called imperfectly secure in the respective models.
Otherwise, it is called insecure in the respective models. In
the following conditions, the information on the edge e(i) is
written as Yi.
(B1) (Recoverability) Bob can recover the message M
from Y3 and Y4 when Eve does not make any
replacement.
(B2) (Secrecy) No active attack ψ˜ from X 3 to X satisfies
one of the following conditions.
ψ˜(Y1, Y
′
1 , Y3) = M, ψ˜(Y1, Y
′
1 , Y4) = M, (1)
ψ˜(Y2, Y
′
2 , Y3) = M, ψ˜(Y2, Y
′
2 , Y4) = M, (2)
where Y ′1 and Y
′
2 are the information replaced by
Eve at the edges e(1) and e(2), and Y3 and Y4 are
the information at the edges e(3) and e(4). This kind
of secrecy is called imperfect security [32], [33].
III. LINEAR CODE
First, we address linear codes over the one-hop relay net-
work only when the message set X is a finite field Fq . As
shown in the recent paper [22], Eve’s noise injection cannot
improve her performance of eavesdropping for linear network
codes. Hence, it is sufficient for analysis of information
leakage to discuss the case when Eve does not contaminate
the eavesdropped information. Since the message is an element
of Fq , the linearity in this problem can be regarded as scalar
linearity [25, Section I]. The following theorem shows the
impossibility of secure communication by using linear codes.
Theorem 1. There is no secure linear code even for passive
attack when the message set X is a finite field Fq .
Proof: Due to the linearity of our code, we can choose a 2×2
matrix A on Fp such that the relations Y3 = A1,1Y1 +A1,2Y2
and Y4 = A2,1Y1 +A2,2Y2 holds when there is no attack.
First, we assume that (A1,1, A1,2) is (0, 0). Eve can obtain
all the information Bob obtains when Eve eavesdrops e(4).
Since Bob can recover the message, Eve can also do it.
Second, we assume that the vector (A1,1, A1,2) 6= (0, 0) is a
constant times of (1, 0). When Eve eavesdrops e(2) and e(3),
Eve can obtain the information of Y1 and Y2, which contains
the information that Bob obtains. Since Bob can recover the
message, Eve can also do it. We obtain the same conclusion
when (A1,1, A1,2) 6= (0, 0) is a constant times of (0, 1) and
Eve eavesdrops e(1) and e(3).
Third, we assume that the vector (A1,1, A1,2) 6= (0, 0) is
not a constant times of (1, 0) nor (1, 0). When Eve eavesdrops
e(3) and e(1), Eve can recover the information Y4 from Y3
and Y1. Hence, Eve obtains all information that the receiver
gets.
M. HAYASHI AND N. CAI: SECURE NETWORK CODE OVER ONE-HOP RELAY NETWORK 4
IV. ANALYSIS WITH F2
The aim of this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. When the message set X is the finite field Fq and
q is a power of 2, there exists a imperfectly secure linear code
for passive attack. However, when the message set X is the
prime field F2, there exists no imperfectly secure linear code
for active attack.
A. Imperfectly secure non-linear code for passive attack
First, to show Theorem 2, we give a special example of our
code on the prime field F2, in which, the intermediate node
performs a non-linear operation as
Y3 := Y1(Y2 + Y1) = Y1(Y2 + 1), (3)
Y4 := (Y1 + 1)(Y2 + Y1) = (Y1 + 1)Y2. (4)
To send the binary information M ∈ F2, we prepare the
binary uniform scramble random variable L ∈ F2. We consider
the following code. The encoder φ is given as
Y1 := L, Y2 := M + L. (5)
The decoder ψ is given as ψ(Y3, Y4) := Y3 + Y4. Since Y3
and Y4 are given as follows under this code;
Y3 = LM, Y4 = LM +M, (6)
the decoder can recover M whatever the value of L.
Now, we consider the leaked information for the passive
attack. As shown in Appendix, the mutual information and
the l1 norm security measure of these cases are calculated as
I(M ;Y1, Y3) = I(M ;Y1, Y4)
=I(M ;Y2, Y3) = I(M ;Y2, Y4) =
1
2
, (7)
d1(M |Y1, Y3) = d1(M |Y1, Y4)
=d1(M |Y2, Y3) = d1(M |Y2, Y4) = 1
2
, (8)
where the l1 norm security measure d1(X|Y ) is defined as
d1(X|Y ) :=
∑
y
∑
x | 1|X |PY (y) − PXY (xy)| by using the
cardinality |X | of the set of outcomes of the variable X . In
this section, we choose 2 as the base of the logarithm. The
values in the above relations does not depend on the choice
of the pair of the eavesdropping edges. When Eve is allowed
to use the above passive attack, (7) shows that the code is
secure in the sense of (B1). Therefore, we obtain the first part
of Theorem 2 when q = 2. When q is a power 2l of 2, l
repetitions of the above non-linear code on the prime field F2
give a an imperfectly secure non-linear code on the finite filed
Fq . Hence, we obtain the first part of Theorem 2 even when
q is a power of 2.
Next, we consider the active attack, which is classified into
the following three cases.
(i) When EE = {e(1), e(3)}, Eve replaces Y1 by 1.
Then, I(M ;Y1, Y3) = 1 because Y3 + Y1 + 1 = M .
(ii) When EE = {e(1), e(4)}, Eve replaces Y1 by 0.
Then, I(M ;Y1, Y4) = 1 because Y4 + Y1 = M .
(iii) When EE = {e(2), e(3)} or {e(2), e(4)}, Eve has
no advantageous active attack.
The cases (i) and (ii) show that this code is insecure under the
above active attack. Hence, this example can be regarded as a
counterexample of the existing result [22][Theorem 1] without
linearity.
Remark 1. As another encoder, we can consider
Y1 := M + L, Y2 := L. (9)
Replacing M + L by L, the analysis can be reduced to the
presented analysis. When the message M is not leaked to e(1)
or e(2) and M can be recovered, the code is essentially the
same as our code as follows.
Assume that the information Y2 on e(2) is independent of
M . Then, we denote it by L. In order that Y1 is independent
and M can be recovered from Y1 and L, Y1 needs to be M+L
or M + L+ 1.
In this model, Eve can completely contaminate the message
M as follows. When Eve takes choice (i), and replaces Y3 by
Y3 + 1, Bob’s decoded message is M + 1. Under choice (ii),
Eve can totally contaminate the message M in a similar way.
B. Uniqueness of network code given in (3) and (4)
The previous subsubsection provided an example where
Eve’s active attack improves her performance. To show the
second part of Theorem 2, we need to show the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. Assume that a code (φ, ϕ, ψ) satisfies the following
conditions. Let Y1 and Y2 be the random variable generated by
the encoder φ when M is subject to the uniform distribution.
We assume that the random variables (Y3, Y4) := ϕ(Y1, Y2)
satisfies the following conditions.
(C1) The relation ψ(Y3, Y4) = M holds.
(C2) There is no deterministic function ψ˜ from F22 to F2
satisfying one of the following conditions.
ψ˜(Y1, Y3) = M, ψ˜(Y1, Y4) = M, (10)
ψ˜(Y2, Y3) = M, ψ˜(Y2, Y4) = M. (11)
Then, there exist functions f1, f2, f3, f4 on F2 such that Y ′i :=
fi(Yi) is given in (3), (4), and (5) with a scramble random
variable L while the variable L might be correlated with M .
Since the number of edges to be attacked is the same as the
transmission rate from Alice to Bob, no linear code works in
this scheme. Hence, we need to introduce a non-linear coding
operation in the intermediate node. Lemma 1 shows that such
a non-linear coding operation is limited to (3) and (4). The
combination of Lemma 1 and the discussion in Subsection
IV-A implies that there is no code over the one-hop relay
network (Fig. 1) to guarantee the secrecy for an active attack.
Hence, we obtain the remaining part of Theorem 2.
However, this theorem assumes a deterministic coding op-
eration on the intermediate node. If we are allowed to use a
randomized operation on the intermediate node in a similar
way to an encoder, we can construct a code whose secrecy
holds even against Eve’s active attack in this situation as
follows. In the first step, we employ the code given in (5).
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Using another scramble random variable L′, the intermediate
node performs the following coding operation:
Y3 := Y1 + Y2 + L
′ = M ′L, Y4 := L
′. (12)
Then, Eve cannot recover the message M from (Y1, Y3),
(Y1, Y4), (Y2, Y3), nor (Y2, Y4). This example shows that the
deterministic condition for ϕ is crucial in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Step (1): To satisfy condition (C1), we need to recover the
message M from (Y1, Y2) from a deterministic function f .
Functions from F22 to F2 are classified as follows.
Y1, Y1 + 1, Y2, Y2 + 1, 0, 1 (13)
Y1 + Y2, Y1 + Y2 + 1, (14)
Y1Y2, (Y1 + 1)(Y2 + 1), (Y1 + 1)Y2, Y1(Y2 + 1), (15)
Y1Y2 + 1, (Y1 + 1)(Y2 + 1) + 1, (Y1 + 1)Y2 + 1,
Y1(Y2 + 1) + 1.
(16)
The cases in (13) are non-secure or do not satisfy (C1). The
cases in (14) are reduced to the case M = Y1 +Y2. The cases
in (15) and (16) are reduced to the case M = Y1Y2. Hence,
we consider only these two cases.
Step (2): Now, we consider the case M = Y1+Y2. When Y3
or Y4 is given as a non-zero linear function of Y1 and Y2, we
denote the random variable as Y∗. Hence, Y1 or Y2 is linearly
independent of Y∗. We denote the linearly independent variable
as Y∗∗. When Eve eavesdrops Y∗ and Y∗∗, she can recover Y1
and Y2 and so she can also recover M . To satisfy Condition
(C2), we need to avoid such an attack, which requires both Y3
and Y4 to be non-linear functions of (Y1, Y2). They are given as
two of the functions given in (15) and (16). Since any function
in (16) is deterministically given from a function given in (15),
we consider only functions in (15). Under this constraint, if
and only if (Y3, Y4) is given as the pair (Y1Y2, (Y1+1)(Y2+1))
or (Y1(Y2 + 1), (Y1 + 1)Y2), we can recover M = Y1 + Y2
from Y3 and Y4. The latter case is the same as (3) and (4).
In the former case, we obtain (3) and (4) by replacing Y2 by
Y2 + 1.
Step (3): Now, we consider the case where M = Y1Y2.
For the same reason as with Step (2), condition (C2) requires
both Y3 and Y4 to be non-linear functions of (Y1, Y2). Thus,
we consider only functions in (15). For secrecy, i.e., to satisfy
(C2), we cannot use Y1Y2. Hence, we need to choose two from
(Y1 + 1)(Y2 + 1), (Y1 + 1)Y2, and Y1(Y2 + 1). However, no
two of them can recover M . To observe this fact, we consider
cases with (Y1 + 1)Y2 and Y1(Y2 + 1). In these cases, when
(Y1, Y2) = (0, 0) or (1, 1), both values are zero. That is, we
cannot distinguish (0, 0) and (1, 1). Hence, we cannot recover
M from (Y1 + 1)Y2 and Y1(Y2 + 1), i.e., condition (C1) does
not hold. We can show this fact in other pairs in the same
way. Therefore, there is no operation satisfying the required
conditions when M = Y1Y2.
V. ANALYSIS WHEN CHARACTERISTIC IS NOT 2
The aim of this section is to prove the statements.
Theorem 3. When the message set X is the quotient ring Zd
with d ≥ 3, there exists an imperfectly secure non-linear code
even for active attack.
When q is pl, l repetitions of the above non-linear code
on the prime field Fp give an imperfectly secure non-linear
code on the finite filed Fq . Hence, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. When the message set X is the finite field Fq
and q is not a power of 2, there exists an imperfectly secure
non-linear code even for active attack.
A. Construction of imperfectly secure code for active attacks
To show Theorem 3, we construct a secure network coding
against any active attack on the one-hop relay network given
in Fig. 1 when the message and the information at the edges
are given as an element of Zd. Here, we define our code
(φ, ϕ, ψ) in the same way as in Subsection IV-B. That is, the
coding operation ϕ on the intermediate node has no additional
scramble random variable.
It shows Theorem 3, it is sufficient to construct a code to
satisfy the conditions (B1) and (B2) given in Subsection II.
Since it is not so easy to check the conditions (B1) and (B2),
we seek equivalent conditions. For simplicity, we employ a
scramble variable L taking values in Zd. Hence, we assume
that the encoder φ in the source node is given as a pair of
functions (φ(1), φ(2)) that maps two random variables (M,L)
to the two variables (Y1, Y2). That is, the encoder φ forms
a function from Z2d to itself. Now, we fix the function φ as
follows
Y1 = φ
(1)(M,L) := M + L, Y2 = φ
(2)(M,L) := L. (17)
For a coding operation ϕ, we define the functions ϕ(3) and
ϕ(4) as
(ϕ(3)(i, j), ϕ(4)(i, j)) := ϕ(i, j). (18)
Then, we regard the functions ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) as matrices as
follows,
ϕ
(3)
i,j := ϕ
(3)(i, j), ϕ
(4)
i,j := ϕ
(4)(i, j). (19)
To discuss condition (B2), we introduce an anti-Latin square.
A matrix ai,j on Zd is called an anti-Latin square when each
row and each column have duplicate elements as 1 0 00 0 2
1 2 2
 ,
 1 0 11 2 1
0 2 0
 , (20)

1 0 3 3
0 0 2 3
1 1 3 2
0 2 2 1
 ,

2 2 1 0
0 3 3 1
0 3 3 0
1 1 2 2
 , (21)
which is the opposite requirement to a Latin square. Therefore,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. When the encoder φ satisfies condition (17),
conditions (B1) and (B2) are rewritten as
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(B1’) For each a ∈ Zd and m 6= m′ ∈ Zd, the rela-
tion Ξa,m(ϕ(3), ϕ(4)) ∩ Ξa,m′(ϕ(3), ϕ(4)) = ∅ holds,
where Ξa,m(ϕ(3), ϕ(4)) := ϕ(4)({(i, i+m)|ϕ(3)i,i+m =
a}).
(B2’) The matrices ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) are anti-Latin squares.
Proof: We have the equivalence between conditions (B1)
and (B1’) because (B1’) means that the pair of ϕ(3)(i, j) and
ϕ(4)(i, j) uniquely identifies the difference m = j − i.
Next, we show the equivalence between (B2) and (B2’). As-
sume that Eve eavesdrops and contaminates Y1 and eavesdrops
Y3. Choosing the replaced information Y ′1 , Eve can choose a
row of the matrix ϕ(3). To prevent Eve from recovering M
perfectly, all the rows of the matrix ϕ(3) need to have duplicate
elements. Hence, to satisfy condition (B2), both matrices ϕ(3)
and ϕ(4) need to satisfy this duplication requirement for all
rows and columns.
Due to Lemma 2, to show Theorem 3, it is sufficient to
construct a pair of anti-Latin squares to satisfy conditions
(B1’) and (B2’). While it is trivial to find anti-Latin squares,
they need to satisfy condition (B1’) as well. Condition (B2’)
forbids a linear operation on the intermediate node in the finite
field case. A pair of anti-Latin squares is called decodable
when it satisfies condition (B1’). That is, a decodable pair of
anti-Latin squares gives a code on the one-hop relay network
given in Fig. 1 satisfying conditions (B1) and (B2). Lemma 1
says that there is no decodable pair of 2×2 anti-Latin squares.
Fortunately, Eq. (20) (Eq. (21)) is a decodable pair of 3 × 3
(4× 4) anti-Latin squares.
However, we can systematically construct decodable pairs
of anti-Latin squares. The following are pairs of anti-Latin
squares for d = 3, 5, 7: 0 1 01 1 2
0 2 2
 ,
 0 2 20 1 0
1 1 2
 , (22)

0 1 2 0 0
1 1 2 3 1
2 2 2 3 4
0 3 3 3 4
0 1 4 4 4
 ,

0 3 3 3 4
0 1 4 4 4
0 1 2 0 0
1 1 2 3 1
2 2 2 3 4
 , (23)

0 1 2 3 0 0 0
1 1 2 3 4 1 1
2 2 2 3 4 5 2
3 3 3 3 4 5 6
0 4 4 4 4 5 6
0 1 5 5 5 5 6
0 1 2 6 6 6 6

,

0 4 4 4 4 5 6
0 1 5 5 5 5 6
0 1 2 6 6 6 6
0 1 2 3 0 0 0
1 1 2 3 4 1 1
2 2 2 3 4 5 2
3 3 3 3 4 5 6

. (24)
These constructions are generalized to the case with a general
odd number d = 2` + 1 as follows. The functions ϕ(3) and
ϕ(4) are defined as
(ϕ(3))−1(k) :=
 (k, k − `), (k, k − `+ 1), . . . ,(k, k − 1), (k, k), (k − 1, k), . . . ,
(k − `+ 1, k), (k − `, k)

(25)
(ϕ(4))−1(k) :=

(k + `, k − `), (k + `, k − `+ 1),
. . . , (k + `, k − 1),
(k + `, k), (k + `− 1, k),
. . . , (k + 1, k), (k, k)
 .
(26)
Then, we have
ϕ(4)(k, k − `) = k − `, (27)
ϕ(4)(k, k − `+ 1) = k − `+ 1, (28)
...
ϕ(4)(k, k − 1) = k − 1 (29)
ϕ(4)(k, k) = k (30)
ϕ(4)(k − 1, k) = k + ` (31)
...
ϕ(4)(k − `+ 1, k) = k + 2 (32)
ϕ(4)(k − `, k) = k + 1, (33)
which satisfy condition (B1’). Hence, the functions ϕ(3) and
ϕ(4) give a pair of anti-Latin squares.
Next, we consider the even case with d ≥ 4. The following
are pairs of anti-Latin squares for d = 4, 6, 8:
0 1 3 3
0 1 2 0
1 1 2 3
0 2 2 3
 ,

0 0 1 0
1 1 1 2
3 2 2 2
3 0 3 3
 , (34)

0 1 2 5 5 5
0 1 2 3 0 0
1 1 2 3 4 1
2 2 2 3 4 5
0 3 3 3 4 5
0 1 4 4 4 5
 ,

1 1 1 2 3 1
2 2 2 2 3 4
5 3 3 3 3 4
5 0 4 4 4 4
5 0 1 5 5 5
0 0 1 2 0 0
 ,
(35)
0 1 2 3 7 7 7 7
0 1 2 3 4 0 0 0
1 1 2 3 4 5 1 1
2 2 2 3 4 5 6 2
3 3 3 3 4 5 6 7
0 4 4 4 4 5 6 7
0 1 5 5 5 5 6 7
0 1 2 6 6 6 6 7

,

2 2 2 2 3 4 5 2
3 3 3 3 3 4 5 6
7 4 4 4 4 4 5 6
7 0 5 5 5 5 5 6
7 0 1 6 6 6 6 6
7 0 1 2 7 7 7 7
0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0
1 1 1 2 3 4 1 1

. (36)
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These constructions are generalized to the case with a general
even number d = 2` with ` ≥ 2 as follows. The functions
ϕ(3) and ϕ(4) are defined as
(ϕ(3))−1(k) :=

(k + 1, k − `+ 1),
(k + 1, k − `+ 2), . . . ,
(k + 1, k − 1), (k + 1, k),
(k, k), (k − 1, k), . . . ,
(k − `+ 2, k), (k − `+ 1, k)
 (37)
(ϕ(4))−1(k) :=

(k − `+ 1, k − `+ 2),
(k − `+ 2, k − `+ 2), . . . ,
(k, k − `+ 2),
(k + 1, k − `+ 2),
(k + 1, k − `+ 1), . . . ,
(k + 1, k − 2`+ 4),
(k + 1, k − 2`+ 3)

. (38)
Then, we have
ϕ(4)(k + 1, k − `+ 1) = k + `, (39)
ϕ(4)(k + 1, k − `+ 2) = k + `+ 1, (40)
...
ϕ(4)(k + 1, k − 1) = k + 2`− 2 (41)
ϕ(4)(k + 1, k) = k + `− 1 (42)
ϕ(4)(k, k) = k + `− 2 (43)
ϕ(4)(k − 1, k) = k + `− 3 (44)
...
ϕ(4)(k − `+ 2, k) = k (45)
ϕ(4)(k − `+ 1, k) = k − 1, (46)
which satisfy condition (B1’). Hence, the functions ϕ(3) and
ϕ(4) give a pair of anti-Latin squares.
In summary, since these examples work with d ≥ 3, we
have proven Theorem 3, i.e., there exists a secure code over
the active attacks on the one-hop relay network (Fig. 1) when
d ≥ 3.
Furthermore, when ϕ is given by these pairs of anti-Latin
squares, Bob can decode L as well as M while the code given
by (20) or (21) cannot. That is, these systematic constructions
work well whenever the encoder φ = (φ(1), φ(2)) is a one-to-
one function on Z2d to satisfy the condition {i|∃j, φ(1)(i, j) =
k} = {i|∃j, φ(2)(i, j) = k} = Zd for any k.
B. Leaked information of our code for passive attacks
Next, we discuss the leaked information under the above
code under passive attacks in a way similar to (7) and (8).
Since for i = 1, 2 and j = 3, 4, the pair M,Yi decides
Y1, Y2, we have H(Yj |MYi) = 0. Since Yi is independent of
M , we have
I(M ;YiYj) = H(M)−H(M |YiYj)
=H(M |Yi)−H(M |YiYj) = I(M ;Yj |Yi)
=H(Yj |Yi)−H(Yj |MYi) = H(Yj |Yi). (47)
When d is odd, we have
H(Yj |Yi) = H(Yj |Yi = yi)
=
d+ 1
2
· 1
d
log
2d
d+ 1
+
d− 1
2
· 1
d
log d (48)
for any yi with i = 1, 2 and j = 3, 4.
When d ≥ 4 and d is even, we have
H(Y3|Y2) = H(Y3|Y2 = y2) = H(Y4|Y1)
=H(Y4|Y1 = y1) = d+ 2
2
· 1
d
log
2d
d+ 2
+
d− 2
2
· 1
d
log d,
(49)
H(Y3|Y1) = H(Y3|Y1 = y1) = H(Y4|Y2)
=H(Y4|Y2 = y2) = 1
2
log 2 +
1
2
log d (50)
for any y1, y2. In summary, when d is large, we have
I(M ;YiYj) =
1
2
log d+
1
2
log 2 +O(
log d
d
). (51)
C. Lower bound of leaked information for passive attacks
Next, to show the optimality of the code defined in Sub-
section V-A, we show that the amount in (51) is close to the
minimum leaked information under a certain condition when
d is large. To derive a lower bound, we consider the following
conditions for our code.
(D1) The coding operation on the intermediate node is
deterministic.
(D2) Alice can use a scramble random variable L.
Since our encoder is given as a stochastic map φ from Z2 to
Z22 in Section II, condition (D2) is a more restrictive condition
for our encoder. Then, we have the following theorem.
Lemma 3. Any network code satisfies the inequality
I(M ;YiY3) + I(M ;YiY4) ≥ 2H(M)− log d (52)
for i = 1, 2.
Proof: Since M is decoded by Y3Y4,
H(M |YiY3) ≤ H(Y3Y4|YiY3) = H(Y4|YiY3) ≤ H(Y4|Yi).
Similarly, we have H(M |YiY4) ≤ H(Y3|YiY4) by replacing
Y3 and Y4. Let i′ be the integer 1 or 2 that is different from
i. Combining them, we have
H(M |YiY3) +H(M |YiY4) ≤ H(Y4|Yi) +H(Y3|YiY4)
=H(Y3Y4|Yi)
(a)
≤ H(YiYi′ |Yi)
=H(Yi′ |Yi) ≤ log d,
where (a) follows from the fact that Y3Y4 is decided by Y1Y2.
Thus, we obtain
I(M ;YiY3) + I(M ;YiY4)
=2H(M)− (H(M |YiY3) +H(M |YiY4))
≥2H(M)− log d.
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Lemma 3 shows that
max
i,j
I(M ;YiYj) ≥ H(M)− 1
2
log d, (53)
where the maximum is chosen from i = 1, 2 and j = 3, 4.
That is, to realize maxi,j I(M ;YiYj) = 0, the message M
needs to satisfy
H(M) ≤ 1
2
log d. (54)
When M is the uniform random variable, (53) can be rewritten
as
max
i,j
I(M ;YiYj) ≥ 1
2
log d. (55)
This lower bound is almost equal to the RHS of (51) when d
is large.
VI. CONCLUSION
TABLE II
SUMMARY FOR SECURITY ANALYSIS OVER THE ONE-HOP RELAY
NETWORK
Code passive attack active attack
linear code when X is Fq insecure insecure
non-linear code with F2 imperfectly secure insecure
non-linear code with Fq imperfectly secure imperfectly secure
and q 6= 2l
In this paper, we have discussed how sequential error
injection affects the information leakage over the one-hop
relay network. For this aim, we have studied secure network
coding for active attacks over the one-hop relay network (Fig.
1) including non-linear operations on the intermediate node.
The obtained results are summarized in Table II.
First, we show that no linear code realizes the security (even
imperfect security) when Eve eavesdrops one channel in both
layers, the intermediate node can make only a deterministic
operation, and the message set X is a finite field Fq . Hence,
to meet the security, the coding operation on the intermediate
node needs to be non-linear. When the message set X is the
finite field F2, we propose a code to satisfy the imperfect
security under the passive attack by Eve. However, it does
not satisfy the imperfect security under the active attack. As
shown in Section IV-B, any code to satisfy the imperfect
security is limited to a code equivalent to this non-linear code.
Hence, unfortunately, no code on the one-hop relay network
is imperfectly secure under active attacks in the binary case.
To realize the imperfect security even under active attacks,
we have studied the case when the message set X is the finite
field Fq with q 6= 2l, which includes the ternary case. This can
be obtained as a simple extension of the case with the prime
field Fp. To characterize the desired security in this case, we
have introduced a new concept an “anti-Latin square”, which
is an opposite concept to a Latin square. That is, such a secure
code can be given as a decodable pair of anti-Latin squares
while the concept of “decodable” is also introduced in Section
V. We have also shown the existence of a decodable pair of
p×p anti-Latin squares when p ≥ 3. This fact shows that there
exists an imperfectly secure code over active attacks except for
the binary case. The obtained analysis of this part still holds
when the message set X is Zd.
In fact, it is still remained an open problem whether there
exists an imperfectly secure code over active attack on the one-
hop relay network when the message set X is F2l with l ≥ 2.
This is an interesting future study. Also, the obtained analysis
depends on the property of the single transmission scheme.
As shown in the paper [23], under the setting of transmission
of multiple letters, there exists a secure code to satisfy the
vector linearity. Since our analysis is limited to the one-hop
relay network, it is a challenging future study to investigate a
similar security analysis over a multiple-layered network.
Due to our analysis, a secure code on our model is limited
to non-linear code to satisfy the conditions (B1’) and (B2’).
Clearly, as mentioned in the end of Subsection IV-A, this type
of codes do not satisfy the robustness when Eve contaminates
the information on the attacked edges. Hence, to realize the
robustness as well as the secrecy, we need to increase the
number of edges between nodes. Since the robustness is
another important issue in secure network coding, it is another
interesting future study to the secrecy and the robustness
jointly over a modified network model.
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APPENDIX
First, we calculate I(M ;Y1, Y3) and d1(M |Y1, Y3). We find
that
PY1,Y3|M (0, 0|0) = PY1,Y3|M (1, 0|0) =
1
2
,
PY1,Y3|M (0, 0|1) = PY1,Y3|M (1, 1|1) =
1
2
,
where the remaining conditional probabilities are zero. Hence,
H(Y1, Y3|M) = 1, H(Y1, Y3) = 1
2
log 2 +
1
2
log 4 =
3
2
,
which implies I(M ;Y1, Y3) = 12 .
Since
PY1,Y3(0, 0) =
1
2
, PY1,Y3(1, 0) = PY1,Y3(1, 1) =
1
4
,
we have
PM |Y1,Y3(0|0, 0) = PM |Y1,Y3(1|0, 0) =
1
2
,
PM |Y1,Y3(0|1, 0) = PM |Y1,Y3(1|1, 1) = 1,
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where the remaining conditional probabilities are zero. There-
fore,
d1(M |Y1, Y3)
=
∣∣∣1
2
P (0, 0)− 1
2
P (0|0, 0)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣1
2
P (1, 0)− 1
2
P (0|1, 0)
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣1
2
P (1, 1)− 1
2
P (0|1, 1)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣1
2
P (0, 0)− 1
2
P (1|0, 0)
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣1
2
P (1, 0)− 1
2
P (1|1, 0)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣1
2
P (1, 1)− 1
2
P (1|1, 1)
∣∣∣
=0 +
1
8
+
1
8
+ 0 +
1
8
+
1
8
=
1
2
.
Replacing M and L by M+1 and L+1, respectively, we can
calculate I(M ;Y1, Y4) and d1(M |Y1, Y4) in the same way.
Next, we consider I(M ;Y2, Y3) and d1(M |Y2, Y3). We find
that
PY2,Y3|M (0, 0|0) = PY2,Y3|M (1, 0|0) =
1
2
,
PY2,Y3|M (0, 1|1) = PY2,Y3|M (1, 0|1) =
1
2
,
where the remaining conditional probabilities are zero. Hence,
replacing (0, 0) and (1, 1) by (1, 0) and (0, 1), respectively, in
the above derivation, we can show I(M ;Y2, Y3) = 12 and
d1(M |Y2, Y3) = 12 . Finally, replacing M and L by M + 1
and L + 1, respectively, we can calculate I(M ;Y2, Y4) and
d1(M |Y2, Y4) in the same way.
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